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The article analyzes the results of several sociological studies on the level and nature of 
religiosity in Ukraine. In particular, the paper deals with the study “State and Church in Ukraine 
2019: the Results of the Year and Prospects for the Development of Relations,” conducted by 
the Razumkov Center with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Representation in 
Ukraine; the latest wave of the World Values Survey, conducted by the Info Sapiens company 
(in Ukraine it was conducted by the Center for Social Monitoring), etc. The statistical data were 
analyzed, particularly official reports on the network of churches and religious organizations 
in Ukraine for the years of 2013, 2017 and 2020. The results of these studies and reports 
substantiate certain quantitative and qualitative changes in religiosity in Ukraine, as well as a 
high level of interfaith tolerance against the background of religious pluralism. 
 
Main Part: Presentation of the Basic Material 
Empirical studies of the religiosity of Ukrainians and the role of the Church in 
Ukrainian society have been conducted for more than three decades by many research 
sociological institutions, including the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the 
Center for Social Monitoring, the Democratic Initiatives organization, the Alexander 
Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies (hereafter the Razumkov Center) and 
others. The Institute for Religious Freedom also constantly monitors changes in the religious 
situation in Ukraine. The website of this organization contains official statistics, particularly 
annual reports on the network of churches and religious organizations in Ukraine, approved by 
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the Orders of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine. The scrupulous analysis of these data allows 
us to assess the dynamics of changes in the number of religious communities in our country 
and, accordingly, to see the main trends in their social impact.  
It should be noted that the number of religious communities in Ukraine grew at the 
fastest pace in the 1990s. And at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, it has 
almost stabilized and is now growing rather insignificantly. In particular, if in 2013 there were 
a total of 35,116 religious communities in Ukraine (1,879 of them were not officially 
registered),i in 2017 there were 35,919 religious communities (1,879 of them were not officially 
registered).1 In 2018, there were 36,739 religious communities in Ukraine (1,329 of them were 
not officially registered), and according to the latest published official data, at the beginning of 
2020 the number of religious organizations in Ukraine reached 36,796 (among them 1,728 
religious communities operating without state registration). Therefore, during 2019, the growth 
of the network of religious organizations in Ukraine was generally insignificant—only 57 
organizations.  
However, during this time a rather significant event happened in Ukraine; there 
appeared a new autocephalous church, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.2 Due to this 
development, the number of registered religious communities in Ukraine decreased by almost 
400 that year. Instead, the number of religious communities operating without the status of a 
legal entity increased by the same amount. This situation, according to religious analyst Andriy 
Smirnov, is partly explained by the fact that after receiving the Tomos, the UOC-KP and UAOC 
disappeared from the Orthodox plane, and all their communities were automatically enrolled 
in the PCU, despite Bishop Filaret seceding and trying to revive the Kyiv Patriarchate.3 We 
note that during this time, the changes among other religious communities were quite 
insignificant.  
The dynamics of religiosity of Ukrainian society and its main trends are analyzed in the 
nationwide study, “State and Church in Ukraine 2019: Results of the Year and Prospects for 
                                                          
1 Звіт про мережу церков і релігійних організацій в Україні станом на 01.01.2013 р. [Report on the network 
of churches and religious organizations in Ukraine as of 01.01. 2017]. https://www.irs.in.ua/ua/zvit-pro-merezhu-
cerkov-i-religiinih-organizacii-v-ukrajini-stanom-na-01012017-r. Accessed 04.24.2021. 
2After the unification Council, which took place on December 15, 2018, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 
Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church legally ceased to exist, becoming part of the newly 
formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 
3 В Україні зросла кількість незареєстрованих релігійних громад – статистика Мінкультури. [The number 
of unregistered religious communities has increased in Ukraine - statistics of the Ministry of Culture].  
https://www.irs.in.ua/ua/statistics-of-religious-organizations-in-ukraine-2020/. Accessed 04.24.2021. 
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Relations.”  The study was conducted by this organization with the support of the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine are worth mentioning.4 The study was conducted in 2019 in 
all regions of Ukraine, except for the Russian-annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 
the Russian-occupied districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In total, 2015 respondents aged 
18 and older were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error did not exceed 2.3%.5 
Let us analyze the results of the study conducted during 2019-2020, comparing them 
with the results of similar studies conducted during 2013-2018, and with some indicators of 
other years. As of today, the level of religiosity in Ukraine does not fluctuate significantly. The 
number of those who identify themselves as believers is currently 66% of the population, which 
corresponds to the indicator of the “pre-war” year of 2013 (then it was 67%). But, in 
comparison with the 2017 results, 80% of respondents considered themselves believers. The 
number of those who hesitate to consider themselves believers or nonbelievers is 12% (this 
figure has been fixed for the second year in a row and is slightly lower than the figure of 15% 
recorded in 2013). The number of other groups changed little during 2013-2019. Thus, the 
shares of unbelievers, “convinced atheists” and those indifferent to matters of faith remained 
insignificant in the study. The number of the first group was in the range of 5-6%, the second 
2-4%, the third in the range of 5-7%. The number of those who did not decide on matters of 
faith was also insignificant (4-6%). The level of religiosity remained higher in the older age 
groups, compared to the younger ones, and among women, compared to men. Thus, the number 
of believers in 2019 increased from 52% among young people aged 18 to 24 to 70% in the 
group of people aged 60 and older; and was 58% among men and 72% among women. It should 
be noted that the levels of religiosity, depending on the level of education, type of settlement 
(city or village) and self-identification of the respondents in the parameters of certain social 
groups, differed only slightly.6 
The idea of religiosity of Ukrainians is complemented by the results of the latest wave 
of the World Values Survey, the field stage of which was conducted in Ukraine from July 21, 
2020, to August 17, 2020, by the Info Sapiens Company and the NGO “Center for Social 
Monitoring.” The results of the latest study allowed us to see the place of Ukraine among other 
countries.  According to the European study in 2020, for more than half of the Ukranian 
respondents (56.3%) God was important to some extent (the answers were 7-10 according to a 
                                                          
4 Держава і церква в Україні 2019: підсумки року і перспективи розвитку відносин: інформаційні 
матеріали. [State and Church in Ukraine 2019: results of the year and prospects for the development of relations: 
information materials]. https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2019_Religiya.pdf. Accessed 04.24.2021. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JUNE 2021) XLI, 5 46
10-point scale, where “10” was very important). At the same time, about a third of the 
respondents chose an extreme score of 10 points, communicating that God’s role is very 
significant in their lives.7 This disposition indicates that religion remains important in the life 
of Ukrainians. However, the attitude to religion as something significant in life became less 
common in the country in 2020 (56.3%) compared to 2011 (64%), although slightly higher 
than in 1996 (54%). Given these dynamics within certain values, we can conclude that in 
general the level of religiosity in Ukraine remains moderately high and fairly stable. And in 
this context, Ukraine is ahead of most Eurozone countries in terms of religiosity. Only Romania 
(84.3%), Greece (78.9%), Cyprus (74.4%), Poland (71.5%), Croatia (62.3%) and Italy (60.7%) 
have higher religiosity than Ukraine. Nevertheless, in all other EU countries, the importance of 
religion is less than in Ukraine.8  
According to the World Values Survey, the share of those who do not believe in God 
in Ukraine today is 14.3%, which is insignificantly different from the data of the above-
mentioned 2019 survey. It allows us to compare the ratio of believers and non-believers in our 
country with Italy (76.2% of believers, 14.1% of non-believers) and Lithuania (73.6 % of 
believers and 13.2% of non-believers).9 The disposition of atheists and believers is directly 
opposite only in Sweden (60.8% of atheists vs. 34.4% of believers, respectively), as well as in 
the Netherlands (53.0% and 41.1%), the Czech Republic (49.8% and 31.0%) and Estonia 
(44.8% and 37.7%).10 The analysis of this parameter (the share of those who identify 
themselves as atheists) allows us to see that religion as such and the attitude to God remains 
for Ukrainians mostly significant and important.  
An important sign of the transformation of religiosity within the country is the 
assessment of the level of interfaith tolerance. In this context, Ukraine has always had a high 
level of tolerance, which is due to the spread and a long-standing coexistence of various 
Christian denominations in the country. Thus, more than a half of Ukrainians, both in 2011 and 
now, in 2021, do not agree that the only acceptable religion is their own religion (60.1%). 
However, more than a third of the respondents believe so. This level of tolerance is similar to 
the level of tolerance in Romania. In this context, compared to other Eurozone countries, 
Ukraine has a relatively high level of interfaith tolerance. 
                                                          
7Світове дослідження цінностей, 2020. [World Values Survey, 2020].  
:http://ucep.org.ua/doslidzhennya/world-values-survey-2020-in-ukraine.html, 135. Accessed 04.24.2021. 
8 Ibid., 138. 
9 Ibid., 139. 
10 Ibid. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JUNE 2021) XLI, 5 47
Regarding the assessment of the level of actual religiosity, an important marker here is 
the stability and frequency of involvement in religious, ritual, and ceremonial practices. It 
should be clarified here that a distinction must be made between factual and declarative 
religiosity. And if the declarative religiosity is fixed simply by the respondents’ definition of 
their confessional affiliation and an affirmative answer to the question of faith in God, the 
marker of the actual religiosity is the participation of a person in the religious life of the 
community of his denomination. In this context, it is interesting to note that in 2020, compared 
to 2011, participation in religious services and involvement in religious practices slightly 
increased from 81.4% to 83.3%. However, the number of people involved in such activities has 
increased significantly. So, the percentage of permanent parishioners increased from 24.1% in 
2011 to 33.8% in 2020, which is a significant growth and indicates an increase in the share of 
real, actual, rather than declarative believers.  
Compared to other countries in the Eurozone, Ukraine in terms of attendance at church 
services, according to 2020, shows indicators that are closest to the positions of Lithuania and 
Croatia. In this context, Ukraine also has a fairly high level compared to most European 
countries. Speaking about the role and importance of religion in society, majority of the 
population of Ukraine believes that religion is designed to do good to others (77.4%), and not 
just to follow religious norms and ceremonies (22.6%). However, if we compare such data with 
2011, we will see a decrease in the number of supporters of the first statement (in 2011–83.7%). 
However, the majority of the respondents both in 2011 (83.3%) and in 2020 (82.4%) believe 
that religion allows us to understand the meaning of life in this world, i. e. before death, not 
after it. This perception of religion prevails in four EU countries, with which we have already 
compared the survey data in Ukraine in 2020. In addition, it should be noted that this position 
is most shared in Germany (86.9%) and in Greece 91.1%.11  
An important indicator of actual religiosity and active religious life in Ukraine is not 
only the confessional affiliation of citizens to equal denominations, but also the membership 
of citizens in various religious organizations. In this context, concerning the issue of increasing 
the membership of Ukrainians in various religious organizations, the study records a significant 
increase in involvement (from 11.9% in 2011 to 28.1% in 2020).12 It should be noted, however, 
that in general the country has intensified public activity over the years and, accordingly, the 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 140. 
12 Ibid. 
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involvement in public organizations as such, be it educational, cultural, etc. According to the 
level of membership in religious organizations, Ukraine is close to Cyprus (24.3%). 
Summing up our analysis, we will outline its main key points. Religiosity as such has 
not decreased in Ukraine, on the contrary–an increase in the number of actual rather than 
declarative believers indicate strengthening of the position of the institution of religion. 
However, the nature of religiosity is changing, namely, the number of those who do not belong 
to any denomination, identifying themselves as “just a believer” or “just a Christian,” is not 
decreasing, but increasing. Thus, a certain reduction (from 64% to 56.3%) in the proportion of 
those who think that God is important in their lives, “...may, according to the authors of the 
European study, indicate a decline in spirituality, rather than an impact of religion on life.”13 
An important marker of the increase in declarative and secular believers is the decrease in the 
percentage of those who pray several times a week or more often from 42.2% to 38.5%. As for 
the place of Ukraine among other Eurozone countries, Ukraine has the closest results in total 
with Croatia and Bulgaria. 
In the context of understanding the trends of transformation of religiosity in Ukraine, 
the issue of a confessional self-determination is important. The distribution of religious 
affiliation has not changed much since the beginning of the monitoring until recent years. As 
before, the majority (about 65%) of the Ukrainian citizens consider themselves Orthodox, but 
this number depends significantly on the regions and ranges from 74% of the residents living 
in the center of Ukraine to 47% of the residents from the western part of the country. At the 
same time, the total number of people who identify themselves as Orthodox fluctuates 
significantly. For example, their number decreased from 71% in 2013 to 65% in 2019, but, on 
the other hand, this figure is approximately equal to the figure in 2000 (then there were 66%).14  
It is noteworthy mentioning that there is a large group of citizens who consider 
themselves believers, but do not belong to any of the religions (their number varies in recent 
years from 20% to 22%). Interestingly, majority of the respondents (59%) agree that “a person 
can simply be a believer and not profess a particular religion.”15 But the percentage of the 
support for this position among representatives of different denominations varies significantly. 
This is the opinion of 54% of the Orthodox believers (here we take into consideration, first of 
                                                          
13Ibid., 18. 
14 Держава і церква в Україні 2019: підсумки року і перспективи розвитку відносин: інформаційні 
матеріали. [State and Church in Ukraine 2019: results of the year and prospects for the development of relations: 
information materials]. https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2019_Religiya.pdf. Accessed 03.17.2021. 
15 Держава і церква в Україні 2019: підсумки року і перспективи розвитку відносин: інформаційні 
матеріали. [State and Church in Ukraine 2019: results of the year and prospects for the development of relations: 
information materials]. https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2019_Religiya.pdf. Accessed 03.17.2021. 
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all, the faithful of the newly formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine (at the time of the poll of the 
faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate)) and 79% of “just 
Christians.” The exception is the group of believers of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 
where the votes have been divided as the following: 49% of the respondents support the 
possibility of “just believing,” and 47% of them insist on the obligation of a confessional 
determination. We observed the greatest negative attitude towards Protestants in 2019 among 
Orthodox who belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (23.9% 
of them had a negative attitude). The least negative and, accordingly, the most positive attitude 
is observed by those who identify themselves as “just Christians” without a specific adherence 
to a denomination, or “just Orthodox” (without belonging to a particular patriarchate).  
The number of people who, according to the Razumkov Center, identify themselves 
with Protestants in Ukraine has an undulatory dynamics (ranging from 2% in 2000 to 0.8 in 
2013, and again to 2.2% in 2018). The number of Protestants in Ukraine is unevenly distributed 
among the regions. Most Protestants are in the Center and East of Ukraine (2.2% each) and the 
least of them are in the West (1.1%) and South (1.7%), respectively.16  
An important marker is the gradual change in attitudes toward Protestantism in Ukraine. 
Thus, if in 2000 only 13.5% of the respondents were positive about Protestantism (44.5% were 
indifferent, and 14.3% were negative), in 2019 we saw a significant increase (22.8%) in 
positive attitudes towards Protestantism. At the same time, the negative attitude decreased to 
11.6%. The share of those who did not hear anything about this religious movement also 
decreased significantly (from 8.1% in 2000 to 1.8% in 2019). The most positive attitude to 
Protestantism is recorded in the West (27.1%) and in the Center (26.7%) of Ukraine; the least 
positive is the attitude in the South and East. The fact that Protestantism is relatively less 
widespread in Western Ukraine, but nevertheless meets with a more positive attitude, is related 
to the specifics of this region, where religiosity in general is much higher than in other regions. 
However, the more traditional Ukrainian denominations (Orthodox and Greek Catholics) are 
prevalent there, which in turn is explained by the relatively shorter period of persecution of 
religion in those areas by the atheistic Soviet authorities during the Soviet era.  
 
Conclusions  
Thus, it is obvious that Ukraine is a country with a high level of religiosity, in which 
favorable conditions for the development of both traditional and non-traditional religions have 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
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been recreated. According to the results of a number of opinion polls, there is a high level of 
religiosity combined with religious pluralism and tolerance, which has been demonstrated by 
Ukrainian society. Against the background of the post-secularity of the post-Soviet era, this 
promotes the active integration of religious organizations into civil society. Currently, the 
social inclusion of religious movements and churches in political and national processes is 
noticeable, which contributes to an internal dialogue and consolidation of society. 
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